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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. MELL WHITNEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 15682 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. 
35-4-10(i) (1953), as amended, for the ?urpose of judicial review of a decision 
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the deci-
sion of the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to the Plaintiff for a period 
of 52 weeks and assessed an overpayment on the grounds the Plaintiff knowingly 
withheld material facts regarding work and earnings in order to receive benefits 
to which he was not entitled. The questions raised on appeal are whether Plain-
tiff has a "vested right" to unemployment benefits and whether the findings of 
fact are supported by the evidence. 
DISPOSITION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits from 
November 14, 1976, to November 12, 1977, a period of 52 weeks, and was assessed 
an overpayment in the amount of $1,147.00 for benefits received during the 
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disqualification period by determination of a Department Hearing Representative 
dated October 3, 1977. By decision dated December 13, 1977, an Appeal Referee 
affirmed the determination of the Hearing Representative. The decision of the 
Appeal Referee was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated January 31, 
1978, in Case No. 77-A-4231, 77-BR-312. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisionsof the Board of Review and 
the Commission. Defendant seeks affirmation of such decisions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff originally filed a claim for unemployment benefits ef-
fective August 1, 1976. (R.0047) Based upon earnings from Deseret Mortuary 
the Plaintiff was determined to be monetarily eligible to receive benefits in 
the amount of $105.00 per week, not to exceed $3,570.00. (R.0046) 
Plaintiff was hospitalized from September 29 to October 9, 1976, for 
treatment of varicose veins. (R.0015, 0019, 0045) On September 27, 1976, a 
psychiatric evaluation was made of Plaintiff to determine whether he could with-
stand surgery (R.0026; CAPPS Mental Status Examination), and Plaintiff made other 
visits to a psychiatrist. (R.0019, 0025, 0030) As part of his treatment the 
Plaintiff underwent surgery; however, the record is unclear as to when the 
surgery occurred, with various dates being indicated: September 29, 1976 
(R.0015), October 18, 1976 (R.0025), December 20, 1976 (R.0019). 
Plaintiff's claim for unemployment benefits was reopened effective 
October 17, 1976, and he continued to receive benefits through November 27, 
1976. (R.0013) On November 18, 1976, the Plaintiff became employed by Z.C.M.I. 
- 2 -
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in Salt Lake City, earning $28.50 during the calendar week ended November 20 and 
$120.00 during the calendar week ended November 27, 1976. (R.0028, 0036) Plain-
tiff filed claims for benefits for each of those weeks, certifying thereon that 
he had no work or earnings. (R.0042, 0043) On his claim for the calendar week 
ended December 4, 1976, Plaintiff reported that he had started work with Z.C.M.I. 
on November 29, 1976. (R.0044) Defendant paid benefits to Plaintiff pursuant 
to his claims for the weeks ended November 20 and November 27, 1976, by warrants 
numbered 762199 and 774393, respectively. (R.0013) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well estab-
lished. Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part: 
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings 
of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the facts if 
supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction 
of said court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This court has consistently held that where the findings of the Com-
mission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be 
disturbed. MaPtinez v. BoaPd of Review, 25 u. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). 
A reversal of an order of the Department denying compensation can only be jus-
tified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the 
facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the Depart-
ment's denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kenneaott 
C C · Emp' Dep~tment of EmpLoyment SeaUJ'ity, 13 U. 2d 262, oppep OPporat&on ~oyees v. ~ 
- 3 -
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372 P. 2d 987 (1962); Goake v. Wiesley, 18 U. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). 
This court stated in Members of Iron Worker's Union of Provo v. Industrial 
Commission, 104 U. 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208, 211 (1943) that: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the 
findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this 
court may not set aside the decision even though on a review 
of the record we might well have reached a different result. 
The court has adhered to this same standard of review in cases in-
volving violation of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Employment Security Act. Deaker 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 533 P. 2d 
898 (1975); Whitaome v. Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 564 P. 2d 1116 (1977). 
POINT II 
CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
IS DETERMINED FROM WEEK TO WEEK BASED ON INFORMATION PRO-
VIDED BY A CLAIMANT ON THE WEEKLY CLAIM FORMS AND PROVIDED 
HE IS NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED. 
The Utah Employment Security Act was enacted to establish a program 
of unemployment insurance to lighten the burdens of unemployment and maintain 
purchasing power in the economy. Singer Sewing Maahine Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479, rehearing denied 104 U. 196, 141 P. 2d 
694 (1943); Lexes v. Industrial Commission, 121 U. 550, 243 P. 2d 964 (1952); 
Johnson v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 7 U. 2d 113, 320 P. 
2d 315 (1958). The statute contains a scheme for computing the amount of bene-
fits to which each claimant is entitled and provides for disqualification when 
certain conditions are present. 
The procedure for computing the amount of benefits to which a claimant 
is entitled is found in Section 35-4-3, U.C.A. 1953. Pursuant thereto, the 
- 4 -
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Department of Employment Security, upon receiving an initial claim and the 
necessary wage information for determining the base period wage credits, pro-
ceeds to compute the weekly benefit amount and the maximum benefit ~nt 
available to the claimant. The determination of those amounts is then mailed 
to the claimant to advise him of his potential entitlement, as illustrated by 
Form 605, Notice of Monetary Determination. (R.0046) However, the issuance 
of a Notice of Monetary Determination does not give rise to a "vested right" 
in the claimant, but only advises of the weekly benefit amount and the maximum 
benefits for which the claimant may become eligible. 
Section 35-4-4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part: 
4. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive 
benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found 
by the commission that: 
(a) He has made a claim for benefits with respect to such 
week in accordance with such regulations as the commission 
may prescribe. 
The balance of Section 4 relates to other requirements for eligibility. Section 
5 of the Employment Security Act provides for conditions of ineligibility under 
which a claimant becomes disqualified from receiving benefits. 
Plaintiff has alleged a "vested right" to unemployment benefits in the 
amount of $3,570.00 by virtue of the Notice of Monetary Determination. (R.0004) 
In order for a right to be vested, it must be absolute, complete, unconditional, 
and not subject to any contingency. 16 Corpus Juris Seaundum, Constitutional 
Law, Section 215. However, nothing in the Notice of Monetary Determination, in 
the Employment Security Act, or in any of the material given to the Plaintiff in 
connection with his claim, suggests that there is an absolute or unconditional 
right to the maximum benefit amount. To the contrary, the statute is explicit 
in setting forth the conditions upon which a claimant obtains eligibility for or 
is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 
- 5 -
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Plaintiff also alleges that he received no instructions with respect 
to the procedures for filing claims. In this regard .it is sufficient to note 
that this case arises from a failure by the Plaintiff to report his work and 
earnings for the weeks ended November 20 and November 27, 1976. The weekly claim 
cards contain simple, unequivocal tnstructfons which require every claimant to 
report all work and earnings, setting forth the hours worked each day and the 
gross amount of earnings, whether paid or not. (R.0042, 0043, 0044) That Plain-
~iff understood these instructions is evident from the fact that he reported such 
information, including an erroneous back-to-work date, on his claim for the week 
ended December 4, 1976, (R.0044) More will be said in this regard in Point III 
hereof. 
Plaintiff further contends that he was improperly advised as to the 
effect of an admission he allegedly made at his first hearing. (See Plaintiff's 
Brief, page 9.) Defendants concede that reference is made to such an admission 
in the decision of the hearing representative. (R.0034) However, the propriety 
of instruction and lack of counsel at the timethe alleged admission was made are 
both immaterial for the reason that the Appeal Referee did not refer to the 
alleged admission in its decision, nor was it made a part of the record. Thus, 
the alleged admission was not a basis for the decision appealed by Plaintiff and 
is not relied upon by Defendants as part of the proof of the violation charged 
to the Plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND THE BOARD AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN DETER-
MINING THAT PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY WITHHELD MATERIAL INFORMATION 
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTITLED. 
Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
- 6 -
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5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(e) For the week with respect to which he had willfully 
made a false statement or representation or knowingly failed 
to report a material fact to obtain any benefit under the 
provisions of this act, and for the 51-week period immedi-
ately following and until he has repaid to the fund all mon-
ies he received by reason of his fraud and which he received 
during such following 51-week disqualification period, pro-
vided that determinations under this subsection shall be 
made only upon a sworn written admission, or after due notice 
and recorded hearing; provided that when a claimant waives 
the recorded hearing a determination shall be made based 
upon all of the facts which the commission, exercising due 
diligence, has been able to obtain; and provided further 
that such determination shall be appealable in the manner 
provided by this act for appeals from other benefit deter-
minations. 
Plaintiff contends on appeal that the decision of the Board of Review 
is not sustained by the evidence. The primary thrust of this contention appears 
to emanate from the fact that Plaintiff underwent psychiatric evaluation and 
treatment during the approximate time period in which the incidences of fraud 
occurred. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff worked during the weeks ended 
November 20 and November 27, 1976, or that he earned $28.50 and $120.00 during 
those respective weeks. (R.0028) Indeed, Plaintiff concedes in his Petition 
for Review, paragraph 4, that he was overpaid for the weeks in question. (R.0004) 
The ultimate question at issue in this matter is whether or not the evidence is 
sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiff harbored the requisite intent at 
the time of filing the questioned claims so as to become subject to the dis-
It has qualifying provisions of Section 5(e) of the Employment Security Act. 
previously been held that intention to defraud is inherent in the claims them-
selves when such claims contain false statements and fail to set forth material 
information required by statute. Martinez v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 576 
- 7 -
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P. 2d 1295 (1978). The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a manifesta-
tion of intent to defraud. ~neer v. Board of Review of the IndustriaZ Commie-
sian of Utah, Utah, 572 P. 2d 1364 (1977). 
In the instant matter the Appeal Referee and Board of Review properly 
inferred from the c~rcumstances of the case that, despite Plaintiff's suffering 
from emotional stress and strain, the elements of knowledge and intent were 
both present. 
The Plaintiff filed his claims for the weeks ended November 20 and 
November 27, 1976, showing in each "zeros" in the boxes wherein he should have 
reported his hours of work, and the words "none" in the boxes where he should 
have reported his gross earnings. The fact that Plaintiff made entries in 
spaces provided for reporting work and earnings demonstrates that he had read 
that portion of the claim card and understood that an entry should be made 
therein. When the Administrative Law Judge in California inquired of the 
Plaintiff as to why he did not report his work and earnings, Plaintiff's answer 
was vague, evasive, and self-serving: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
You were required to fill out a 
Continued Claim Card, uh, for the 
weeks ended November 20, 1976, 
and November 27, 1976, uh, and 
apparently on that card or cards 
for those two weeks you did not 
show that you had worked or earned 
any wages. 
Uh, that I felt was the period that 
I was still living with my son in 
Salt Lake and that he was paying 
my full support, and for that reason 
they said there would be a waiting 
period until, uh, this claim was 
allowed. So that's the reason I 
reported. (R.0029) 
It is unclear to what "waiting period" the Plaintiff was referring, but his 
- 8 -
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answer suggests that the reason he withheld the information of his work and 
earnings was the possibility of delay in receiving benefits. It should be noted 
that Plaintiff's claim had been reopened effective October 17, 1976, and that he 
received benefits continuously through November 27, 1976. (R.0013) At that 
point in the claim series there was no "w~iting period" for which Plaintiff 
would have been required to await the receipt of benefits. 
In addition to the response Plaintiff gave the California Administra-
tive Law Judge, which is quoted above, the Plaintiff, at an earlier point in the 
hearing, provided an equally vague, evasive, and self-serving response to a very 
similar question: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
All right now. When, uh, Mr. 
Floyd, the other Administrative 
Law Judge, who listened to your 
testimony on August 30, 1977, when 
he asked you, uh, a question, uh, 
as to why you collected unemploy-
ment benefots (sic) for these 
weeks in which you worked without 
reporting all of your wages, uh, 
apparently you told him it was 
because you needed the money. 
Uh, that was because I had not 
been advised nor did I read the 
things, the materials and the, 
uh, written evidence such as 
letter, time cards, payroll, and 
personnel records and physician 
statements of health if health is 
an issue, he didn't bother going 
into that. Mr. Floyd was very, 
very brief and so he represented 
that if I would make a statement 
at that time that I had received 
these monies for this time worked 
that that would probably be all 
that the, uh, appeals board would 
need in Utah. However, I feel 
that because of the great, uh, 
emotional stress and the fact that 
I was living with my son and his 
- 9 -
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family, that they were the sole 
support of myself, uh, uh, you 
know, to include food, shelter, and 
everything else there that I owed 
them, uh, something for that, and 
this is what I made the statement 
based on, but I had not the slightest 
idea that they would deny all of the 
benefits under the eligibility in 
the State of Utah that I was to 
receive because of this short period 
of time that I had worked during the 
holidays. Uh, in fact, as I showed 
you, Mr. Fielding, I have the eli-
gibility card with me that shows 
$3,570.00 in maximum benefits that 
should be paid to me from the State 
of Utah for, uh, the work that I 
had done there for Deseret Mortuary 
just based on that alone. So, in 
no way do I feel that, uh, I am 
liable for this $1,147.00. Uh, 
absolutely no way, uh, I would take 
that to an attorney, I would not, 
uh, agree to pay that amount back, 
uh, under any conditions •• 
(R.0028) (Emphasis added.) 
That Plaintiff had knowledge of his responsibility to report his 
work and earnings is evidenced by the fact that he made "zero" and "none" 
entries in the appropriate boxes of the claim cards in question. Furthermore, 
immediately after the week in question Plaintiff reported his work and earnings 
for the week ended December 4, 1976. (But note that Plaintiff reported earnings 
of $192.00, when he actually earned $120.00 according to the employer's report 
at R.0036.) Even if, as the Plaintiff contends, he filed the first two claims 
under emotional stress, he apparently functioned normally at the time he com-
pleted the third claim. Plaintiff made no attempt, however, at that time to 
return the benefit check (No. 774393) for the week ended November 27, 1976, 
which he received with his claim for the week ended December 4, 1976. The 
record shows the check and claim were mailed to Plaintiff on November 30, 1976. 
(R.0013) 
- 10 -
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.. 
It should also be noted at this point that Plaintiff appears to have 
functioned normally enough tg maintain a full-time job during the weeks in 
question and in fact until the end of December 1976. 
Finally, and perhaps most significant, is Plaintiff's act of reporting 
on his claim for the week ended December 4, 1976, that he had begun work on 
November 29, 1976, when, in fact, he had started work on November 18, 1976. He 
also reported on that claim card that he had started work in shipping and 
receiving when, according to his own testimony, he had actually started on a 
trial basis in the tailor shop. (R.0025, 0028) 
Plaintiff's testimony with respect to his mental state is also vague, 
evasive, and self-serving. He contends on appeal that he had undergone a series 
of psychiatric tests and treatment from October 18 to December 1976. (R.0015) 
Plaintiff testified that his visits in December 1976 were for treatment because 
of his state of mind: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Claimant: 
Then, uh, there's a letter dated 
December 20, 1976, 
That was, 
Uh, what, what is that? 
That was for psychiatric treatment. 
I found that I was in need of some 
kind of counsel for the state of 
mind that I found myself in and 
they had a very good psychiatrist 
there at the hospital, a doctor Katz. 
All right. And then there is another 
day here, 12-22-76, uh, 
That was another appointment with 
Dr. Katz. 
Okay. 
Uh, I had a series of appointments 
with him. (R.0025) 
- 11 -
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., 
However, at another point in the hearing Plaintiff had responded somewhat dif-
ferently concerning the purpose of his visits with the psychiatrist: 
Administrative Law Judge: Pardon me, this is apparently because 
you were physically unable to work 
during that time, or • • • 
Claimant! Yeah, that was the period they were 
putting me through a series of psy-
chiatric tests at the V. A. Hospital 
prior to my surgery. Uh, I went 
through a series of tests after being 
admitted there as it shows on the ad-
missions card on September 29. And, 
uh, this was quite an extensive 
series of tests in that, uh, it was 
done by a psychiatrist there for the 
purpose of determing (sic), uh, you 
know, the state of mind and the 
ability to, uh, uh, 
Administrative Law Judge: Withstand the surgery. 
Claimant: Withstand, yes. 
Administrative Law Judge: To, to, uh, see whether you, uh, 
could safely undergo surgery. 
Claimant: That's true. (R.0026) 
Despite Plaintiff's contentions to the contrary, in view of such con-
flicting testimony the Appeal Referee and Board of Review reasonably concluded 
that Plaintiff's visits with the psychiatrist, at least prior to December 20, 
were for the purpose of determining his ability to withstand surgery, rather 
than for treatment of his mental state. The CAPPS Mental Status Examination 
Report, added to the record by stipulation of counsel for the parties, is less 
than illuminating in this regard, other than to show that the examination was 
done on September 27, 1976. Both the Board of Review and this court are left to 
speculate as to why Plaintiff has not offered other documentary evidence as to 
his visits with Dr. Katz, if such were indeed for purposes other than post-
surgery review. 
- 12 -
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CONCLUSION 
, 
,; 
There is substantial evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff understood 
the requirement to report his work and earnings. Despite that knowledge, he 
certified that he had no work or earnings for the weeks in question and subse-
quent thereto reported a false back-to-work date. 
The existence of the elements of knowledge and intent was properly 
inferred by the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review from the circumstances 
and evidence as set forth in the record. Plaintiff's testimony with respect 
to the reasons he failed to report his work and earnings was vague, evasive, 
and self-serving and Defendant was not bound to accept such testimony. The 
documentary evidence submitted by Plaintiff through stipulation of counsel 
supports Plaintiff's testimony that the psychiatric visits, at least prior to 
surgery, were for the purpose of determining whether he could withstand such 
surgery, and sheds no light on the question of whether or not Plaintiff was 
capable of committing fraud in claiming unemployment insurance benefits. Thus, 
there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision of the 
Board of Review and it should, therefore, be affirmed. 
- 13 -
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